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LIMITED SOLUTION TO A DANGEROUS 
PROBLEM: THE FUTURE OF THE  
OIL POLLUTION ACT 
Garry A. Gabison1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Catastrophic incidents have the potential to provoke government 
action. In the words of former Chief of Staff for President Barack 
Obama, Rahm Emmanuel, “[y]ou never want a serious crisis to go to 
waste.”2  In the case of two major past environmental disasters, Congress 
did not let the opportunity for new environmental legislation to pass 
unrealized. In 1980, following the 1979 Love Canal incident,3 the United 
States Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).4 Similarly, Congress 
passed the Oil Pollution Act5 of 19906 (OPA) following the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez environmental disaster.7   
                                            
 1. Ph.D. in Economics at Yale University and J.D. at the University of Virginia 
School of Law.  I would like to thank Prof. Richard Brooks for inspiring this Comment 
during our conversations about his own paper.  I would also like to thank Prof. George 
Cohen for our conversations about the implication of lender liability.  All mistakes are 
my own.  
 2. Gerald Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity For Obama, WALL ST. J., November 21, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721278056345271.html. 
 3. Starting in the 1920’s, the Hooker Chemical Company dumped pollutants into the 
Love Canal.  In 1953, the Company sold the dumpsite to the local municipality and the 
municipality built houses on the site. Local inhabitants of the site started exhibiting 
medical problems and, in response, drastic measures were taken. Not only did the State of 
New York purchase the property and evacuate the residents, but President Carter declared 
a state of emergency and, eventually, Congress passed CERCLA. See Eckardt C. Beck, 
The Love Canal Tragedy, 5 EPA J. 17, 17-18 (1979), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/lovecanal/01.html.  
 4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).  
 5. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of titles 16, 26, 33, 43 and 46 U.S.C.) [hereinafter OPA]. 
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In 2010, British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon exploded and 
released 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.8  This event 
was one of the most catastrophic environmental events in U.S. history 
and yet, Congress has failed to pass sweeping environmental reform.9  
Not only have the enormous environmental and economic impacts 
caused by the release put the OPA to the test, but the OPA has proven 
insufficient.  Although Congress designed the OPA with tanker spills in 
mind, this Comment finds that, even for tanker spills, the OPA is flawed.  
Further, this Comment will suggest ways to improve the OPA and argues 
that Congress should act by increasing financial and criminal liability in 
order to prevent future spills. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of water pollution in 
the United States and continues to discuss the Exxon Valdez disaster, the 
OPA,10  and the Deepwater Horizon disaster.   Part III argues that the 
OPA is inefficient because it only sufficiently focuses on medium sized 
tanker spills, leaving large spills at the mercy of the benevolence of the 
polluter while doing little to deter minor spills.  Part IV discusses 
different ways to address the OPA’s inefficiencies and Part V concludes 
that Congress can reduce the occurrence of environmental disasters by 
extending liability to lenders, shareholders, and employees through the 
use of criminal liability.   
                                                                                                  
 6. In the United States, “[t]he Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 streamlined and 
strengthened the [Environmental Protection Agency]’s ability to prevent and respond to 
catastrophic oil spills . . .  The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) works with 
other federal partners to prevent accidents as well as to maintain superior response 
capabilities.”  EPA, SUMMARY OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT, http://www.epa.gov/ 
lawsregs/laws/opa.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 7. The oil tanker Exxon Valdez sunk and discharged approximately 11 million 
gallons of oil into the Prince William Sound. NORA CHIDLOW, U.S. COAST GUARD, THE 
COAST GUARD’S ROLE IN THE EXXON VALDEZ INCIDENT, available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/ history/articles/EV.pdf. 
 8. NAT’L INCIDENT COMMAND, INTERAGENCY SOLUTIONS GRP., FLOW RATE 
TECHNICAL GRP, ASSESSMENT OF FLOW RATE ESTIMATES FOR THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON/MACONDO WELL OIL SPILL  (2011). 
 9. See Justin Gillis, Where Gulf Spill Might Place on the Roll of Great Disasters, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010, at A1. 
 10. Three elements of the OPA that are discussed include: (1) the outlawing of single-
hull tankers; (2) increased tort liability and the creation of a private right of action to deal 
with medium to small spills; and (3) the creation of a fund for victims. 
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II.  HISTORY: EXXON VALDEZ, THE OIL POLLUTION ACT, AND DEEPWATER 
HORIZON 
Water pollution, as a basis for a cause of action, was first litigated in 
U.S. courts in 1828.11  Litigation efforts based on water pollution tended 
to utilize private12 or public nuisance.13  The use of nuisance, although 
somewhat successful, was often inadequate to deal with pollution 
problems and was a “meager response to the crowdedness of society.”14 
To remedy this inadequacy, Congress passed the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act in 1948.15  However, Congress limited the 
remedies available to water pollution victims as “[u]nder the [Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948], private parties could not recover 
damages or cleanup costs caused by an oil spill from a vessel” and “the 
private plaintiff had to establish culpable negligence.”16  Congress 
amended this act numerous times and in 1978 passed a sweeping 
amendment to the Act called the Clean Water Act (CWA).17  Although 
the CWA removed some liability limits, states were charged with 
bringing legal action, a form of enforcement that did not “establish 
effective preventive and immediate response mechanisms.”18  Further 
substantive Congressional action did not happen until a catastrophic 
environmental disaster occurred. 
                                            
 11. See, e.g., Tate v. Parrish, 23 Ky. 325 (7 T.B.Mon. 325)(1828) (questioning 
whether the defendant was liable for polluting a spring by placing a dead hog in it).  
 12. See id. See also Howell v. McCoy, 3 Rawle 256 (Pa. 1832) (holding that a tenant 
along a river bed could not “empty the contents of his tan-yard into the stream” as it was 
a private nuisance that violated private property rights).  
 13. But see United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Vt. 
1972) (“[r]evitaliz[ing] ‘poor old nuisance’ as a legal theory useful in the resolution of 
pollution conflicts involving interstate or navigable waters”). 
 14. Id. at 149 n. 6. 
 15. Federal Water Pollution Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).  
 16. Browne Lewis, It’s Been 4380 Days and Counting Since Exxon Valdez: Is It Time 
to Change the Oil Pollution Act of 1990?, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 103 (2001). 
 17. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387. See also EPA, 
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER Act, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cwahistory.html 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2011). 
 18. Lewis, supra note 16, at 104. 
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A.  The Exxon Valdez Disaster 
“Shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, the 987-foot tank[er] 
vessel Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. 
What followed was the largest oil spill in U.S. history.”19  The Coast 
Guard immediately closed the Port of Valdez to all traffic.20  In total, 
nearly eleven million gallons of oil, out of the fifty-three million gallons 
of oil on board, spilled into the Sound.21   
The Exxon Valdez disaster cost Exxon over $3.4 billion dollars, 
including $2.1 billion for cleanup efforts, $125 million in fines and 
restitution for pleading guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act and 
other statutes,22 at least $900 million to settle a civil action with the 
United States and Alaska, and another $303 million in voluntary 
payments to private parties.23  Despite Exxon’s efforts and expense, the 
spill caused irreversible damage still present over twenty years after the 
accident.24 
B.  The Oil Pollution Act 
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez disaster, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).25  The OPA capped liability26 for 
responsible parties with respect to removal costs and damages for oil 
spills that are not the result of gross negligence.27  On top of these federal 
                                            
 19. SAMUEL K. SKINNER & WILLIAM K. REILLY, NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM THE EXXON 




 20. NORA CHIDLOW, U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COAST GUARD’S ROLE IN THE EXXON 
VALDEZ INCIDENT, available at http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/EV.pdf.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479 (2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. “[A]fter the passage of twenty-one years, spilled oil remains just beneath the 
surface of the rocky shoreline of Prince William Sound and the region’s famed herring 
runs have still not returned to their pre-spill levels.  According to a recent report on the 
aftermath of that oil spill, despite the appearance of Prince William Sound today,  ‘the 
area has not fully recovered.’”  Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and 
Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the Second 
Decade, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 4 (2011). 
 25. See OPA, supra note 5.  
 26. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2703-2704 (2006).  
 27. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). See also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 101-102 
(2000). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-795T,  COST OF MAJOR 
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caps, Congress left room for individual states to add further liability.28  
Following Congress’s suggestions, most (though not all) coastal states 
passed legislation creating unlimited liability for vessel operators, vessel 
owners, and lenders.29  Beyond the cap, the OPA limits liability in three 
situations: the wrongdoers are not liable if the spill was due to an “act of 
God,” an “act of war,” or “an act or omission of a third party.”30  Finally, 
the OPA fixed one problem with the Clean Water Act by creating a 
private right of action.31  
Congress also provided the Coast Guard with some means to deal 
with future spills.  The OPA gave authority to the Coast Guard and the 
EPA to use the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (the Fund) to establish a 
first response32 and gave the Coast Guard responsibility to investigate 
and determine the identity of the responsible parties.33 
The OPA also authorized the direct regulation of tankers and 
established incremental dates to phase in a requirement that all covered 
tanker vessels have a double hull.”34  The next section discusses the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, which also falls under the OPA.  
                                                                                                  
SPILLS MAY IMPACT VIABILITY OF OIL SPILL LIABILITY TRUST FUND, 8 tbl. 1 (2010), 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? [hereinafter USGAO-1] (providing detail on the 
damage caps). 
 28. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(2) (2006) (allowing “[s]tate and local officials....[to] assess 
natural resource damages...for the natural resources under their trusteeship.”). See also 
Michael A. de Gennaro, Oil Pollution Liability and Control, Under International 
Maritime Law: Market Incentives as an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265, 272-73 (2004) (“Congress did not cap liability, deciding instead to 
permit states to impose liability in addition to the federal liability, though many states 
have failed to impose additional liability on oil transporters.”). 
 29. Richard R. W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J. L. & ECON. 91, 
101 tbl. 1 (2002) (showing how different coastal states have reacted. For example, 
Virginia and Texas kept a limited cap on liability whereas Washington and Oregon 
removed the cap on liability). 
 30. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2004).  Other environmental statutes, like CERCLA, have an 
identical provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002).  These statutes imply that a 
transporter must have some fault in an accident to be held liable for environmental 
damages.  However, other inherently dangerous activities have not shielded some 
principals from liability, as discussed below. 
 31. “A person may bring a civil action for contribution against any other person who 
is liable or potentially liable under this Act or another law.” 33 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). 
 32. USCG, The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), http://www.uscg.mil/ 
npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 33. See OPA, supra note 5. 
 34. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 102 (2000).  See also 46 U.S.C. § 3703a 
(2006).  
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C.  Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred on the oil rig Deepwater 
Horizon that caused oil to spew into the Gulf of Mexico.35  Of the 126 
crew members, 11 men were killed, and at least 17 others were 
physically injured.36  The Coast Guard, Transocean (the owner of the 
Rig), and British Petroleum coordinated and attempted to close the well 
but, despite their efforts, it took three months to stop the leak.37  At its 
conclusion, a staggering 4.9 million barrels of oil spilled into the ocean, 
making it the largest oil spill in United States history.38 
In the aftermath of the spill, the Coast Guard designated the 
Deepwater Horizon as a “mobile offshore drilling unit,”  which placed 
the vessel under the umbrella of the OPA.39  Under the OPA, the Coast 
Guard designated British Petroleum40 and Transocean41 as responsible 
parties, a designation that both accepted.42  Although Transocean, a 
leading offshore drilling contractor, owned and operated the Deepwater 
Horizon,43  British Petroleum (BP), one of the world’s largest energy 
companies, leased Deepwater Horizon and was the principal operator of 
the Macondo oil field. As a consequence, they were ultimately 
responsible for the spill by contract.44   
                                            
 35. H.R. REP NO. 111-521, at 5 (2010).  
 36. Id. 
 37. USCG, ON THE SCENE COORDINATION REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, 
APP. (Sept. 2011), http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/FOSC_DWH_Report.pdf. 
 38. CAMPBELL ROBERTSON, U.S. Puts Oil Spill Total at Nearly 5 Million Barrels, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03flow.html. 
 39. Under U.S. law, a mobile offshore drilling unit is “a vessel (other than a self-
elevating lift vessel) capable of use as an offshore facility.” 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(18) 
(2010). 
 40. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and U.S. Coast Guard to BP Exploration 
& Prod. Inc. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/2886.pdf. 
 41. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and U.S. Coast Guard to Transocean 
Holdings Inc. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/2886.pdf.  
 42. Although Transocean accepted responsible party designation for any above-water 
discharge of oil, Transocean denied designation as a responsible party “for any 
underwater discharges of oil from the well head….” Letter from the Law Firm of 
Nicoletti Hornig & Sweeny to U.S. Coast Guard (May 3, 2010), available at  
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/2094.pdf.  See also Liability Issues Surrounding the 
Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Testimony Before The Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives, (May 27, 2010) (statement of Rachel Giesber Clingman, Acting as Co-
General Counsel, Transocean [in re Horizon Incident]) http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/Clingman100527.pdf. 
 43. H.R. REP NO. 111-521, at 5 (2010). 
 44. Id. 
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Immediately after the incident, BP put $20 billion dollars in escrow 
to help compensate for damages caused by the oil spill.45  However, this 
was only the beginning.  In March 2012, BP agreed to a settlement46  and 
to date, BP has spent approximately $14 billion in cleanup, $8 billion in 
payments to individuals and businesses, and $7.8 billion in settlements.47  
BP did attempt to recoup some of its losses from Transocean, but failed48 
when the Eastern District Court of Louisiana found that the contract 
required BP “to indemnify Transocean for compensatory damages 
asserted by third parties against Transocean related to pollution that did 
not originate on or above the surface of the water.”49   
Despite the ability to blame several companies for the spill,50 the 
OPA does not hold every person involved equally liable.  It is for this 
reason that the Deepwater Horizon incident calls into question the 
functioning and the existence of the OPA.   
III.  THE LIMITATIONS OF THE OPA 
The single hull tanker prohibition is a command-and-control 
regulation. Command-and-control regulations specify a precise standard 
of care that market participants must follow in order to take part in the 
market.51  On the other hand, market-based regulations, like the liability 
                                            
 45. Editorial, Settlement for the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/opinion/settlement-for-the-gulf.html. 
 46. John Schwartz, BP Settlement, Milestone for Some Victims, a Setback for Others, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/us/bp-
settlement-leaves-some-spill-victims-unhappy.html. 
 47. John Schwartz, Papers Detail BP Settlement in Gulf Oil Spill,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/us/papers-detail-bp-
settlement-in-gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill.html. 
 48. John M. Broder, Ruling Favors Owner of Rig in Gulf Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/business/energy-environment/ 
transocean-not-liable-for-some-gulf-spill-claims-judge-rules.html. 
 49. In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf  of Mexico, on 
April 20, 2010. MDL No. 2179 at *29 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2012), 
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/012612Order(TransoceanIndemnity).pdf. 
 50. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, 
REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSE OF THE APRIL 20, 2010 MACONDO WELL BLOWOUT, 173-
89  (Sept. 14 2011), http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/DWH_IR/reports 
/dwhfinal.pdf (placing some blame on Halliburton, who conducted the cement job, Sperry 
Sun, who was monitoring the well, and Cameron, who designed the blowout preventer 
stack) [hereinafter BOEMRE report]. 
 51. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 
(1960).  Coase argues for caution when setting these standards.  “What has to be decided 
is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be 
230 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:2 
 
and victims fund aspects of the OPA, let market participants pick their 
level of care. Nonetheless, participants must pay taxes52 and purchase 
transferable emission permits in order to take part in the market.53  
Whereas command-and-control regulations tend to be rigid and often not 
adaptable,  market-based regulations are more adaptable if properly 
calibrated. 
                                                                                                  
suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces harm.” Id. at 14. 
Additionally, Coase argues that the forbearance of all activities with negative 
externalities may decrease overall social welfare because stopping polluters from 
polluting also stops production.  He advocates that well-defined property rights, whether 
liability or property rules, are essential to reach the optimal outcome.  This article 
famously led to the Coase theorem: “[i]t is necessary to know whether the damaging 
business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial 
delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine 
them.”  Id. at 7. 
 52. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, (1920).  As 
early as 1920, Pigou built on Alfred Marshall’s concept of externalities, which recognizes 
that valuation of the same good may vary from the private producer to the public. See 1 
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, (9th ed. 1961).  Pigou recommends a 
“tax . . . , [the levy of which] would make the values of the marginal trade net product of 
resources . . . more nearly similar to the value of the marginal trade net product of 
resources in general.”  Id. at 193. 
 53. See J.H. Dales, Land, Water, and Ownership, 1 THE CANADIAN J. OF ECON. 791, 
801 (1968) (advocating a “market-based” solution to the problem of pollution and 
depletion using transferrable permits.  Dales suggests assigning pollution rights and 
selling those rights to market participants.).  This work inspired a number of regulations 
such as the Clean Air Act, which created a market for permits to emit sulfur dioxide. 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651l (1990). Under the Clean Air Act, a polluter must 
hold as many valid permits in his emission bank, supervised by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), as emissions he has emitted over the year. Id. at § 7651(g).  
These permits constitute what is akin to a de jure right to pollute.  The idea of allowance 
permits has often been attributed to Dales, even though Dales focused his research on 
water rights. See Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as a 
Form of Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental 
Pollution, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 51 (2011).  Two years before Dale, however, 
Thomas Crocker published similar research on air rights. Thomas D. Crocker, The 
Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR 
POLLUTION. (Harold Wolozin ed. 1966).  See also W. David Montgomery, Markets in 
Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. OF ECON. THEORY 395 (1972) 
(attempting to provide a deeper analysis of the use of an allowance market to deal with 
pollution problems). 
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A.  Single Hull Tanker Prohibition 
1. Single-Hull Prohibition Focuses on Major Spills 
Command-and-control regulations require careful crafting.  Before 
drafting the OPA to prohibit the use of single-hull tankers,54 Congress 
identified single-hull tankers as the most likely source of risk because a 
single hull increases the chance of hull failure and these hulls are often 
associated with large spills.55   
The attempt by Congress to eliminate major spills from single-hull 
tankers appears to be the most efficient course of action in that major 
incidents constitute the main source of pollution by quantity spilled.56  
Although this attempt perceived as efficient, large incidents are rare and 
were decreasing in number even before the passing of the OPA.57 
Moreover, hull failures were involved in only 7% of oil spills.58  Thus, 
the Congressional focus on single-hull vessels may not have led to as 
efficient regulation as first perceived. 
2.  From Single-Hull Tankers to Aging Tankers 
Unfortunately, the single-hull ban created in the OPA was not 
enforced until December 31, 2010, and the phasing-out59 provisions of 
the OPA allow for some retrofitted ships to stay in service until January 
1, 2015.60  As a result of this slow, single-hull phase-out and the 
grandfathering provisions, the OPA might have actually increased the 
chance of pollution from a single-hull tanker as the OPA requires all new 
tankers to have a double hull.61  Thus, the OPA actually incentivizes 
                                            
 54. OPA, supra note 5, at §4115. 
 55. USGAO-1, supra note 27, at 19 n. 41 (“Of the 51 major oil spills, all 24 major 
spills from tank vessels (tankers and tank barges) involved single-hull vessels.”).  Notable 
spills involving single hull tankers include the Valdez (1989), Erika (1999), and Prestige 
(2002) incidents. Id. 
 56. Major spills were responsible for 42% of all oil spilled in the 1970’s and 73% of 
oil spilled in the 1990’s.  The Int’l Tanker Owners Pollution Fed’n Ltd., Information 
Services, Statistics, Fig. 7,  http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-
statistics/statistics/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter ITOPF]. 
 57. Dropping from 55% of all incidents recorded during the 1970’s to only 7% during 
the 2000’s. Id. at Fig. 2. 
 58. Id. at Fig. 13. 
 59. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (2012). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 46 U.S.C. 3703(a) (2012). This grandfatherization problem is well documented.  
See, e.g., Randy A. Nelson, Tom Tietenberg & Michael R. Donihue, Differential 
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companies to keep single-hull tankers in use longer than they would have 
without the OPA.62  Older vessels also pose a greater risk to the 
environment as there is “a proven tendency for the incidence of serious 
casualties to increase as vessel age rises.”63   
Additionally, the Congressional focus on the type of hull instead of 
the age of the tanker may have been counterproductive.  The phasing-out 
was too slow and too lenient.  This phasing-out allowed oil tankers up to 
forty years old to remain in use.64  In comparison, the European 
Community (EC) phased in their prohibition of single-hull tankers within 
only six years, from 2001 to 2007.65  
Furthermore, the OPA is focused on the transport of oil and 
hazardous products, but does not discuss storage facilities.66  Tanker 
                                                                                                  
Environmental Regulations: Effects on Electricity Utility Capital Turnover and 
Emissions, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 368, 368 (1993).  For instance, in 1970, Congress 
passed the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and the New Source Performance 
Standards.  Id. at 369.  These two pieces of legislation capped the emissions of newly 
constructed plants, while they grandfathered older plants. Id.  Randy A. Nelson, Tom 
Tietenberg and Michael R. Donihue estimated the effect of the first amendments of the 
Clean Air Act Amendment on the lifespan of plants and found that these early regulations 
increased the lifespan by 3.29 years on average.  Id. at 373.  However, they estimate that 
without regulation, emissions would have been 34.6% higher. Id.   
 62. Guillaume Gourdet & Paulo Biasotto, Converting Single Hull F(P)SO Challenges 
Regarding Inspection, Repair and Maintenance, VERISTAR, http://www.veristar.com/ 
content/static/veristarinfo/images/2966.1.Converted%20single%20hull%20F(P)SO%20c
hallenges%20regarding%20inspection,%20repair%20and%20maintenance.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Gourdet]. If a tanker travels through multiple 
states/countries with different minimum criteria for their tankers, the contractor or oil 
transporter will use a tanker that fulfills the most stringent regulation. Id. 
 63. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. THE COST TO USERS OF SUBSTANDARD 
SHIPPING 8 (2001), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/18/1827388.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD]. The relative risk of a spill increases for ships over the age of fifteen.  See id. at 
app. 4. 
 64. Commc’n from the Comm’n to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Safety of the Seaborne Oil Trade, 25 (Mar. 21, 2000), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0142:FIN:EN:PDF. The 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships was quicker to phase 
out single hull tankers in comparison to the OPA. Id. 
 65. See Eur. Parl. Reg. 417/2002 (on the accelerated phasing-in of double hull or 
equivalent design requirements for single hull oil tankers and the repeal of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2978/94).  However, the EC may have benefited from the U.S. 
phase-out because they knew that any transporter willing to trade with the United States 
would have had to phase-out by 2010 regardless.  Thus, the regulation did not seem as 
harsh to transporters and may not have encountered as much resistance. 
 66. “[F]loating production, storage, and offloading vessels (FPSOs)…are large ships 
equipped with oil processing and storage capabilities…. However, FPSOs are largely 
treated in MARPOL as floating platforms…. Because FPSOs do not carry or deliver the 
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companies took advantage of this omission by converting single-hull 
tankers into storage facilities.67  While these conversions may have 
soothed some of the discontent associated with the  phase-out, concerns 
remain about the solidity of these storage facilities. Using single-hull 
tankers as storage facilities increases the number of container transfers 
and this has the potential to increase the chance of an oil spill, as most 
spills do not occur due to hull breaks or accidents but during loading and 
discharging.68   
3.  Lessons to Be Learned 
In the past, Congress has rushed to create environmental law in the 
wake of catastrophic environmental disasters.69  As a result, Congress 
may not have properly addressed problems exposed by disaster. If 
Congress favors70 command-and-control policies,71 Congress could look 
to policies other countries have implemented. For instance, the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer “did not have a remote-control 
shut-off switch (‘acoustic switch’), a last-resort protection mechanism, 
[as] it is not required by U.S. regulators, but is mandatory in Brazil and 
                                                                                                  
oil anywhere…, they do not fall under the definition of oil tanker.”  Carlos J. Moreno, Oil 
and Gas Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Guinea: Can the New Gulf Be 
Green?, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 419, 433 (2009). 
 67. Gourdet, supra note 62. 
 68. ITOPF, supra note 56, at table 4 (demonstrating that about a third of all accidents 
are due to loading and discharging of oil tankers and the large majority of oil spills are 
due to tanker operations rather than accidents).  
 69. See supra Part I. 
 70. Until 1990, Congress favored command-and-control regulations; however, these 
regulations were maladapted.  For instance, one of the early projects of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), after its creation in 1970, was the phase-out of 
leaded gasoline.  However, as the maximum lead content in gasoline became harder to 
meet, it “caus[ed] small refiners substantial difficulty in meeting the standards on time.” 
Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, The Market-Based Phasedown, in MOVING TO 
MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 171, 178 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. 
Kolstad eds., 2007). As a result, the EPA opted for the first large-scale, market-based 
federal solution to a pollution problem by using a permit system to deal with the lead 
problem. See EPA Sets New Limits on Lead in Gasoline, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Mar. 4, 1985), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lead/01.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2013). 
 71. The same year Congress passed the OPA, it opted for a market-based solution to 
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions.  Congress resorted to this market-based solution after 
multiple failed attempts in the Clean Air Act of 1963, and its amendments in 1970 and 
1977, failed.  See History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa_history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
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Norway, and is used by other major oil companies even where not 
mandatory.”72   
One way to react swiftly in the face of environmental disaster may 
be to give an administrative agency power to research a problem and 
implement a solution that would better serve the environment.  The 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 
(Bureau) investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster and identified a 
number of possible human,73 mechanical,74 and design errors that may 
have contributed to the explosion.75   
The Bureau’s report offered a number of suggestions to prevent 
future accidents76 and called for several regulatory changes.77  The  report 
found that regulations were maladapted to both shallow and deeper water 
drilling78  and suggested mechanical, structural, and design changes to 
drilling wells.79  The report also suggested that the Bureau research the 
problems further to make safety suggestions80 and stated that the Bureau 
should inspect wells more often and more thoroughly.81   
A regulatory agency’s ability to react quickly to make pertinent 
regulatory changes after an environmental disaster with limited political 
consideration, makes it a potential valuable Congressional delegate for 
fixing problems with the OPA.  
B.  Increasing Financial Liability 
1.  Restitution for Victims 
Under the OPA, Congress gave victims of oil spills an opportunity to 
obtain ex-post restitution to be made whole.82  Congress also increased 
                                            
 72. Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability, 
86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 55 (2011). 
 73. BOEMRE report, supra note 50, at 109-14. 
 74. Id. at 125-28. 
 75. Id. at 155-56. 
 76. The Bureau “found that [current] regulations in place at the time of the blowout 
could be enhanced in a number of areas, including: cementing procedures and testing; 
[blowout preventer] configuration and testing; well integrity testing; and other drilling 
operations.  In addition, the Panel found that there were a number of ways in which the 
[current] drilling inspections program could be improved.” Id. at 7. 
 77. Id. at 207-09. 
 78. See id. at 172. 
 79. Id. at 202-03. 
 80. Id. at 204-07. 
 81. Id. at 207-09. 
 82. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). 
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liability in an attempt to give victims socially and privately efficient 
incentives to pursue a suit.83  Litigation costs, however, may thwart this 
opportunity. On the one hand, victims of these large spills would likely 
overcome the transaction costs and liquidity constraints of a class action 
lawsuit because other members of society, such as law firms, will likely 
offer their services for a contingent fee.  However, polluters will likely 
deal with large spills, regardless of liability, in an effort to maintain good 
will. For example, in the Deepwater Horizon incident, BP established a 
twenty billion dollar fund in June 2010 before any lawsuit was filed to 
deal with potentially arising claims.84  One explanation for this action is 
that BP was attempting to regain the good will it lost as a result of the 
catastrophic spill.85 
On the other hand, victims may find it hard to deal with small to 
medium size spills as   the expected tort restitution does not suffice to 
overcome transaction costs or liquidity constraints of victims.86  
Enforcement of the OPA likely suffers from this issue in that the Coast 
Guard or the Bureau will not pursue all cases due to budget constraints.87   
2.  Pollution Deterrence 
Congressional attempts to deter spills may backfire as large liability 
incentivizes financially responsible corporations to cease operations, 
outsource oil transportation, and hide behind the corporate veil.  The 
transport of oil may be left to small, judgment-proof operators, with rusty 
                                            
 83. Id. 
 84. BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for Deepwater Horizon Spill and 
Outlines Dividend Decisions, BP (June 16, 2010), available athttp://www.bp.com/ 
genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7062966. 
 85. See Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP Chief to Express Contrition in Remarks 
to Panel, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/ 
politics/17obama.html. 
 86. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 115, 142-43 (2004) (arguing that large transaction costs and large class action 
costs associated with environmental protection may create gaps that, if too large, cannot 
be filled by court-supported litigation and may require the intervention of a regulatory 
body). 
 87. The liquidity constraint issue is widespread.  For instance, when enforcing the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006), the “EPA places a higher priority on cases in which it 
hopes to recover more than $200,000” because of budget constraint, and hardly 
prosecutes or attempts to recover from smaller incidents. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-09656, SUPERFUND LITIGATION HAS DECREASED AND EPA NEEDS 
BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM 
FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 32 , available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09656.pdf. 
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ships and limited resources, to prevent spills or to clean them up.88  This 
problem materialized very quickly after the Valdez incident: Exxon 
created a wholly owned subsidiary SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., to which it 
transferred the Valdez and subsequently renamed it to avoid any 
prejudice associated with the name. 89 
However, unlike Exxon, other major oil companies have not 
systematically divested their fleet. In fact, many of these companies have 
moved in the opposite direction and are now transporting more of their 
own crude oil in U.S. waters (both as a percentage and in absolute 
terms), than they did before the heightened liability imposed in the wake 
of the Exxon Valdez accident.90  This lack of divestiture could cause these 
large financially responsible corporations to lose some goodwill when 
accidents occur as their name often remains associated with the 
shipwreck.91  The corporations may also be found vicariously liable for 
                                            
 88. See Jennifer H. Arlen & Bentley W. Mcleod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique 
of Vicarious Liability, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 122-24 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) 
(discussing the general claim that individual tort liability encourages firms to contract out 
risky activities in order to take advantage of so-called judgment-proof opportunities).  For 
more empirical evidence, see Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large-
Scale, Long-Term Hazards, 98 J. POL. ECON. 574 (1990); Jay B. Barney, Frances L. 
Edwards & Al H. Ringleb, Organizational Responses to Legal Liability: Employee 
Exposure to Hazardous Materials, Vertical Integration, and Small Firm Production, 35 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 328 (1992).  See also Kathleen Segerson, An Assessment of Legal 
Liability as a Market Based Instrument, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 264-65 (discussing the results of a number of studies supporting that firms 
have a tendency to outsource hazardous operations to small judgment-proof firms). 
 89. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 478 n. 1 (2008) (“[t]he tanker 
survived the accident and remained in Exxon’s fleet, which it subsequently transferred to 
a wholly owned subsidiary, SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. The Valdez ‘was renamed several 
times, finally to the SeaRiver Mediterranean, [and] carried oil between the Persian Gulf 
and Japan, Singapore, and Australia for 12 years. . . . In 2002, the ship was pulled from 
service and ‘laid up’ off a foreign port . . . , although, according to some reports, the 
vessel continues in service under a foreign flag.’”)  
 90. Brooks, supra note 29, at 110. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, Exxon fought the 
award of punitive damages.  Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 481.  A jury trial awarded 
$5 billion in punitive damages that was later reduced to $2.5 billion by the Circuit Court. 
Id.  The Supreme Court further reduced the award, setting the punitive damages at a 1:1 
ratio with compensatory damages or $507.5 million. Id. at 515. 
 91. The Total Erika episode exemplifies this problem: the company attempted to 
distance itself from the incident but the public held Total responsible for the disaster. 
“‘There must always be a devil,’ Daniel Soulez-Larivière, the lawyer coordinating 
Total’s defense, told the court. He said the legal proceedings had been ‘contaminated’ 
against Total by public opinion after the sinking of the Erika.” Heather Smith, Total 
Presents Defense in Criminal Trial Resulting from Erika Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 
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the actions of their subsidiary.92  For instance, in the Total Erika incident, 
the ship was carrying oil that Total France, SA sold to Total International 
Ltd., who hired a third party for the transport of oil.93  Regardless, in 
March 2010, Total was found criminally liable on appeal94 and had to 
pay a fine of €375,000 as “[t]he presiding judge . . .  held Total 
responsible as the ‘real charterer of the boat.’”95  In general, the 
“defenses [in the Act] are not merely limited, but they are also narrowly 
construed by the courts.  Consequently, responsible parties are rarely 
successful in establishing a complete defense to liability under OPA”96 
and courts have a narrow construction of the third-party defense that 
“rarely enables a party to avoid liability.”97 
Outsourcing may also not be privately efficient because a judgment-
proof transporter that the oil company hires is also judgment-proof in 
respect to the oil company.  As a result, the transporter may not take 
reasonable care to avoid a spill and may destroy a large amount of the 
cargo, costing the oil company millions of dollars. Consequently, the fear 
that the OPA created over-deterrence never fully materialized.  One 
explanation for this may be that liability is capped.98  Thus, increasing 
financial liability might lead a company to take more responsibility and 
avoid spills.   
                                                                                                  
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/06/business/worldbusiness/06iht-
total.4.6026965.html. 
 92. Total’s vicarious liability suits illustrate a danger that companies face when 
operating in the United States.  
 93. Nicolas de Sadeleer, Liability for Oil Pollution Damages Versus Liability for 
Waste Management: The Polluter Pays Principle at the Rescue of the Victims,  21 J. 
ENVTL. L. 299, 300 (2009).  In Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA,  the European 
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), the court held that the producer of a product who 
already sold the product can also be found liable if his conduct contributed to the risk. Id. 
at 304. 
 94. Total settled most of the civil claims.  As of September 2009, over seven thousand 
tort liability compensatory claims had been submitted.  Over eighty-five percent of those 
claims have been settled, mostly through the international pollution fund (IOPC).  The 
rest of the claims have been rejected, while nineteen are still pending.  Insurers paid ten 
percent of these claims.   
 95. Matthew Saltmarsh, French Court Upholds Verdict in Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES  (Mar. 
20, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/business/energy-
environment/ 31total.html. See Sadeleer, supra note 93. 
 96. Robert Force et al., Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, 
Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 900 (2011). 
 97. Id. at 902. 
 98. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2011). 
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3.  Lessons to Be Learned 
The OPA must better address small and medium spills.  One way to 
address the high transaction costs and liquidity constraints faced by 
parties bringing suit when such spills occur is to allow punitive damages. 
One obstacle to this approach, however, is that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has capped the level of punitive damages available in such cases to the 
level of compensatory damages awarded.99  This amount of damages is 
simply not enough to incentivize parties to litigate such suits, causing 
small to medium sized spills to go legally unaddressed. Therefore, 
Congress should pass legislation allowing punitive damages to encourage 
greater enforcement. 
Congress should also address the potential for large spills by 
removing the current cap on cleanup costs. Without doing so, victims 
will not receive full compensation and will not efficiently participate in 
the market.  Removing this cap may also efficiently deter potential 
polluters by forcing them to internalize all of their costs.100  Still, it is 
important to note that completely removing the cap on clean up costs 
may lead to over-deterrence of an efficient activity,101 and large punitive 
damage awards could make the issue even worse.102   
The current system is designed based on the low probability of 
accidents.  For example, the OPA does not require a responsible party to 
be able to cover its whole fleet, but “only to meet the amount of the 
maximum liability applicable to the vessel having the greatest maximum 
                                            
 99. In Exxon Shipping Co., the Court held that the Clean Water Act does not preempt 
maritime common law on punitive damages, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 
486 (2008), and that the common law limits punitive damages to an amount equal to the 
amount of compensatory damages awarded. Id. at 513.  The broad and inaccurate 
assumption that every spill is equally costly to mitigate and the fact that only major spills 
are litigated, both give rise to inefficient levels of deterrence.  The former incentivizes 
over-deterrence and the latter incentivizes under-deterrence.  Thus tanker companies may 
find it hard to properly estimate the actual cleanup costs of a spill.  Punitive damages and 
the number of spills litigated both have deterrent effects, and may help to achieve 
efficient levels of deterrence. 
 100. Theoretically, complete liability is not necessary to reach the efficient level of 
care because part of the cost of an accident is externalized by victims.  This reality 
encourages potential tortfeasors to maintain a level of care above the socially efficient 
level.  However, the theoretical model depends on the transporters’ wealth, making the 
pool of socially efficient transporters relatively small and quite close to full 
capitalization.  Lisa L. Posey, Limited Liability and Incentives when Firms Can Inflict 
Damages Greater than Net Worth, 13 INT’L R. OF L. & ECON. 325, 325 (1993).  For this 
reason, the level of activity may remain inefficient even when the level of care is not. 
 101. Perry, supra note 72, at 17. 
 102. Id. 
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liability,”103  as two concurrent accidents by vessels in the same fleet is 
highly unlikely. If removing the cap on clean up costs creates too great of 
a deterrent effect, Congress could require liability insurance in order to 
navigate, or in the case of offshore drilling, operate in U.S. waters.104  An 
insurance system gives transporters and drillers some marginal incentive 
to take proper care because any incident will affect their premiums and 
deductibles. 
Finally, Congress should impose strict vicarious liability on all 
potentially responsible parties, including the oil owners.105  Currently, 
corporations can shield themselves from liability by outsourcing.106  Oil 
companies may not have full control over third party contractors,107 but 
imposing vicarious liability will encourage oil companies to better 
monitor their subcontractors.  When deciding whether to contract out, oil 
companies make two decisions: (1) with whom to enter into a contract; 
and (2) on what terms to contract.   
Congress can deal with the first decision in one of two ways.  First, 
the OPA needs to encompass strict, joint, and vicarious liability of all 
involved parties.  The potential responsible parties can sort out the 
allocation of liability through contractual obligation108 and the parties 
could have a clear default rule that would allow these companies to 
negotiate more efficiently.109   
                                            
 103. 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2010). 
 104. While the traditional problems of moral hazard associated with insurance still 
arise with mandatory insurance, adverse selection is completely eradicated.  In the 
aftermath of Erika, the European Commission touched on this issue.  Eduard Somers & 
Gwendoline Gonsaeles, The Consequence of the Sinking of the M/S Erika in European 
Waters: Toward a Total Loss for International Shipping Law?, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 57, 
63 (2010) (“[T]he Commission considers the thresholds for losing the right to limit 
liability for ship owners too high and even refers to a general trend since the 1990’s to 
abolish limitation of liability linked to a compulsory insurance mechanism.”).   
 105. USGAO-1, supra note 27, at 22 (suggesting extending liability to owners as an 
option that could decrease the Fund’s vulnerability). 
 106. Peter S. Menell, Legal Advising on Corporate Structure in the New Era of 
Environmental Liability, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399, 402-03 (1990) (suggesting that 
a corporation’s exposure to liability can be minimized by creation of subsidiaries, or 
through contractual relations). 
 107. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(2004). 
 108. BP and Transocean dealt with this issue of allocation in their Deepwater Horizon 
contract. See In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf  of Mexico, 
on April 20, 2010, No. 2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2012)(order granting and denying parties’ 
motions for summary judgment).  
 109. In the absence of such negotiations, Congress ought to create some default rules: 
(1) blame can be based on financial responsibility and capacity to pay; (2) blame can be 
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Of course, over-deterrence may not be an issue as much as under-
deterrence.  In the case of the Deepwater Horizon incident, Transocean 
contracted its liability out and therefore lacked the incentive to take 
proper care. 110  As the party assuming liability, BP had an incentive to 
take precautions.  Thus, the incentive does not disappear, it moves, and 
knowing who has that incentive and responsibility is crucial for all 
involved.  However, joint liability may be better for third parties, as joint 
liability can help to avoid lengthy litigation for the victims and avoid 
litigation costs due to the complexities that accompany corporate use of 
liability-shielding strategies. 
Second, the OPA needs to create a better negligent hiring rule.  The 
hiring company, its employees, and managers need to be held vicariously 
liable for knowingly or negligently hiring a reckless transporter, 
regardless of the business judgment rule.111  Even though this negligent 
hiring rule already exists, it is rarely applied112 and can be difficult to 
prove because it requires some evidence of the hiring motives. 
Moreover, Congress needs to rewrite the statute and change the 
burden of proof. If victims must sue the hiring company because the 
subcontractor is judgment-proof, the hiring company ought to bear the 
                                                                                                  
based on the parties’ share of the profits.  The contours and implications of these default 
rules are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
 110. Transocean Inc., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business-
/companies/transocean_ltd/index.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2013). 
 111. Managers and board members enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule, 
which counsels courts to give these decision makers some deference.  “Under the 
business judgment rule, courts defer to fiduciaries’ business judgments as long as there is 
no conflict of interest present and the decision is reached conscientiously, on the basis of 
reasonably full information, and with a good faith belief that the decision is in the best 
interests of the firm.”  Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 983, 1022 (2011).  Under this rule, the manager of a tanker company may cut 
corners to increase profits without personal penalties. For instance, in In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the court found that the directors did not breach their 
duty of care to the corporation when they made a poor investment decision.  In re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 112. For instance, in Cassano v. Aschoff, the court held that the principal was not 
vicariously liable for the tort of his independent contractor even though the principal did 
not inquire whether the contractor was insured.  Cassano v. Aschoff, 543 A.2d 973, 976 
(N.J. Super. 1988).  See also Richmond v. White Mount Recreation Ass’n, 674 A2d 153, 
155 (N.H. 1996) (holding that the principal was not negligent when he hired the 
independent contractor without inquiring into the equipment and personnel to be 
employed); Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 707 A.2d 977, 983 (N.J. 1998) (holding that an owner 
was not liable for hiring an independent contractor who did not have insurance and was 
driving with a suspended license). 
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burden of proof because the hiring company knows its motive and has 
access to the evidence. This presumption against the contracting 
companies would provide more deterrence  for medium size spills than 
increasing caps on liability would.  This is because it would substantially 
decrease the cost of litigation and further encourage victims to seek 
retribution. 
Congress must also address the second question of contract terms.  
The contracting company may offer payments that are too low for the 
transport or drilling company to take proper care; the value of the 
contract affects the level of care taken.113  Thus, even if the oil company 
attempts to circumvent liability by delegating control,114 a below-market 
offer should also be grounds for liability.115 
This scheme of hiring and contracting liability will affect the 
distribution of liability for small and medium spills.  It will also 
encourage victims to bring such actions for small and medium spills, and 
will thereby prevent more of these spills from occurring.  These changes 
will not affect the enforcement actions taken against large spills.  A 
                                            
 113. A simple model could show that an oil company, like a principal, may be in a 
position to know ex-ante how its transporting contractor will behave, based on reputation 
and/or other public information like the type of ships that the transporter uses and the age 
of those ships.  
 114. Principals usually are responsible for the torts their agents cause within the scope 
of employment because principals control or have the right to control their agents’ 
actions and because employers reap the benefits of their employees’ work and thus must 
also bear the costs.  See, e.g., Heims v. Hanke, 93 N.W.2d 455, 457-58 (Wis. 1958) 
(holding that the defendant was vicariously liable for the action of his nephew because 
the action of his gratuitous helper was under his control, or he at least had the right to 
control).  Control is a question of fact and courts look to evidence of the right to control 
such as the right to discharge the agent’s employees, the regularity and duration of the 
agent’s employment, and more importantly, the degree of supervision over the agent. See 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(1958) (listing factors such as the extent of the principal’s 
control over details of the work, skills required, line of business, and length of contract, 
that elevate an independent contractor relationship to an agency liability carrying 
relationship). 
 115. Oil companies are large and hence are likely to have some monopsony power and 
leverage to negotiate the price of the transport.  Three of the top five Fortune 500 
companies are oil companies and, because of their size, some leverage in the bargaining 
process is to be expected.  Fortune 500, CNN MONEY http://money.cnn.com/magazines-
/fortune/fortune500/2012/full_list/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).  The five largest oil 
companies (British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, and Texaco) 
accounted for the majority of oil shipments after passage of the OPA.  Brooks, supra note 
29, at 110. 
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second mechanism deals with small and medium spills: the Fund.  The 
next section discusses the Fund in more detail. 
C.  Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
The Fund is a market-based solution to oil spills “financed primarily 
from a per-barrel tax on petroleum products.”116  The Fund has a balance 
of about one hundred million dollars117  and was created to “pay for oil 
spill costs when the responsible party cannot or does not pay.”118  The 
responsible party may not pay for the cost of a spill for a number of 
reasons: the Coast Guard cannot identify the polluter; the polluter is 
judgment proof; the victims face liquidity constraints;119 the victims do 
not have enough private incentive;120 or, the cost may simply be 
capped.121  
The Fund fills an important gap because most spills fall under the 
small-spill category, and are not litigated.  “The majority of spills from 
tankers result from routine operations such as loading, discharging and 
bunkering which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals.  The 
                                            
 116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1085, MAJOR OIL SPILLS OCCUR 
INFREQUENTLY BUT RISKS TO THE FEDERAL OIL SPILL FUND REMAIN 2 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO-08-1085 (2007) [hereinafter USGAO-2]. The 
Fund is used to cover the costs of: the removal and disposal of oil; the salary of 
employees working on spill responses; prevention measures; reimbursement for damage 
to natural resources or to real or personal property; reimbursement for loss of the means 
of subsistence and for lost governmental revenues; and public services rendered in the 
wake of the accidents.  Id. at 12 tbl. 1. 
 117. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil-
/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp (last updated Feb. 22, 2012). 
 118. USGAO-1, supra note 27, at 1.   
 119. Claim adjudication may take a number of years and victims must pay their own 
litigation costs.  For instance, in Exxon Shipping Co., over twenty years elapsed from the 
date of the accident to the date that the case was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 471 (2008).  In the end, the Ninth Circuit 
Court held that each party would bear their own litigation costs. Exxon Valdez v. Exxon 
Mobil, 568 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009).  Similarly, litigation following the Total 
Erika spill dragged on for close to ten years.  See Smith, supra note 91.  Private 
individuals are required to pay court fees and other litigation expenses, which may be 
hard to afford initially, let alone maintain for long periods.   
 120. Small spills also run into some transaction cost issues. Because boats move and 
water flows, the costs of forming a class action and identifying the polluter are likely to 
outweigh the private benefits of a suit. 
 121. Damages for oil spills that do not qualify as grossly negligent remain capped.  See 
USGAO-1, supra note 27, at 8 tbl. 1. 
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majority of these operational spills are small, with over 90% involving 
quantities of less than 7 ton[]s.”122   
The Fund avoids leaving these small spills unattended to accumulate 
over time.  Between 1990 and 2006, “51 oil spills [occurred] involving 
removal costs and damage claims totaling $1 million or more. In all, the 
Fund spent $240 million on these spills, and the responsible parties 
themselves spent about $620 million to $840 million.”123 Less than two 
percent of oil spills from vessels, since 1990, had removal costs and 
damage claims of $1 million or greater.”124  Even for smaller spills, the 
Fund contributed between a third and a quarter of the cleanup cost.125 
On one hand, the advantage of such a Fund is that it avoids the 
transaction costs associated with litigation of small and medium spills.126  
On the other hand, the disadvantage is that funds, in general, have 
substantial administrative costs and potential improper-allocation 
inefficiencies.127  These internal problems have threatened the existence 
of the Fund.   
However, the Fund has a more concrete threat: potential complete 
depletion after a major spill from a judgment-proof party.128  Its balance 
                                            
 122. Tim Wadsworth, To Carry or Not to Carry? Onboard Spill Response Equipment – 
Is it Practicable?, ITOPF LTD. 1 (1998), http://www.itopf.com/information-
services/publications/papers/documents/OnboardEquipment_000.pdf. 
 123. USGAO-2, supra note 116, at 15. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Other environmental legislation like CERCLA has attempted to incorporate these 
cost savings.  Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund 
Amendment and Reauthorization: How is the Clinton Administration Handling 
Hazardous Waste?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 245, 257 (1998)(“A push towards 
legislation that would reduce some of the private party litigation through de micromis and 
de minimis liability relief is expected to provide greater efficiency in allocating 
responsibility under CERCLA.”).  
 127. The Fund has several documented allocation problems that include: disbursement 
without proper document; disbursement without adequate administrative approval; 
disbursement without documentation of the use of funds; improper disbursement of the 
fund; or even, wasteful spending.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-340R, 
U.S. COAST GUARD NATIONAL POLLUTION FUNDS CENTER: IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED 
IN INTERNAL CONTROL OVER DISBURSEMENTS 30-38 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-340R (2004)[hereinafter USGAO-3].See also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-114R, U.S. COAST GUARD NATIONAL POLLUTION 
FUNDS CENTER: CLAIMS PAYMENT PROCESS WAS FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY, BUT 
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF IMPROPER PAYMENTS 25 
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-114R   [hereinafter USGAO-4]. 
 128. “The Fund is currently authorized to pay out a maximum of $1 billion on a single 
spill for response costs, with up to $500 million for natural resource damage claims.” 
USGAO-1, supra note 27, at 22. Large incidents like the Exxon Valdez had an estimated 
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is about $1.1 million, and could be completely depleted by any 
catastrophe similar to the Valdez, which required Exxon to spend some 
$2.2 billion in cleanup efforts.129  The Deepwater Horizon spilled almost 
twenty times the content of the Valdez: this spill only reinforced the fear. 
The Fund does not deter these small spills because polluting companies 
only carry a portion of the cost.  Thus, the polluters do not fully 
internalize the cost of their own pollution.  Instead, victims of pollution 
bear the burden of the true cost of pollution, even though these victims 
did not voluntarily decide to participate in the market.   
The Fund requires that each market participant pay a tax with the 
proceeds of the tax being used to pay some of the costs that result from 
an accident. This “fundraising” resembles an insurance system where the 
pool of market participants is the pool of the insured.  The Fund 
circumvents some of the insurance moral hazard problems by requiring 
participants to pay based on the amount of barrels produced. However, 
some moral hazard problems remain, as other market participants and 
victims still must bear costs associated with the accident, not borne by 
the polluter.  
The Fund is a market-based solution subject to the same problem as 
every market-based solution: pricing issues.  The Fund relies on a 
Pigovian tax130  that is currently set too low.131  Proposed legislation132 
has advocated “raising the tax from the current $0.08 per barrel to $0.34 
                                                                                                  
“$2.2 billion for cleanup costs alone, according to the vessel’s owner.” Id. at 21.  This 
cost should put in perspective that the disaster could have been much worse: the Exxon 
Valdez only discharged about 20 percent of the oil it was carrying.  A catastrophic spill 
from a vessel could result in costs that exceed those of the Exxon Valdez, particularly if 
the entire contents of a tanker were released in a ‘worst-case discharge’ scenario.”  Id. at 
21 n. 47. 
 129. Id. at 21. 
 130. “The Fund is financed primarily from a per-barrel tax on petroleum products 
either produced in the United States or imported from other countries.”  USGAO-1, supra 
note 27, at 12. 
 131. Ian W.H. Parry & Kenneth Small, Does Britain or the United States Have the 
Right Gasoline Tax?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1276, 1283 (2005), have estimated that the 
proper Pigovian tax, to internalize all the costs of transportation including pollution, 
should be closer to $1.01 per gallon or more than twice the current rate.  They also 
account for the “Ramsey” component, which argues that less elastic products should be 
taxed more to raise revenues.  They estimate that the demand price elasticity is 0.55, 
which is less than  the elasticity threshold.  The same exercise was performed for the 
United Kingdom and it was found that the gasoline tax there is set at twice the socially 
optimal level. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 
111th Cong. (2010). 
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[to] . . . increase the likelihood that there is sufficient money available in 
the Fund if costs exceed the responsible party’s liability limits.”133   
To prevent this problem, Congress ought to make the tax adjustable.  
It should be adjusted every year for inflation.  Additionally, Congress 
should set the tax as a percentage of the cost of the barrel with a floor, 
below which the tax cannot fall.  Congress can alternatively give the 
Bureau or the Coast Guard power to change the tax yearly, depending on 
the current size of the Fund and accidents in the previous one to five 
years. 
Oil transporters and drillers may complain that imposing a tax, as 
well as liability, on an oil transporter amounts to a double payment for an 
accident.  This double payment has the potential to over-deter and 
decrease the level of care taken.  The Coast Guard, however, can address 
this problem by providing an annual refund of the taxes levied on 
particular oil companies displaying good behavior each year. 
Consequently, the fund and tax could be used like a “security deposit” on 
the environment, thus improving transporter and driller incentives.  
Although the solution will have some administrative costs, these costs 
will probably be present under any solution and will be out weighted by 
the significant benefits.  
Previous scholars have advocated for the widespread use of tradable 
permits as a solution to the pollution. 134  Others have reiterated that these 
permits may be the solution to this particular problem.135  The greatest 
                                            
 133. USGAO-1, supra note 27, at 22. 
 134. In Land, Water, and Ownership, J.H. Dales is one of the first to advocate a 
“market-based” solution to the problem of pollution and depletion using transferrable 
permits. J.H. Dales, Land, Water, and Ownership, 1 CANADIAN J. ECON. 791, 801 (1968). 
He suggests creating transferable pollution rights that can be sold to market participants. 
Id.  Title IV-A of the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990), codified 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651 et 
seq., created a market for permits to emit sulfur dioxide.  A polluter had to hold valid 
permits in his emission bank, supervised by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
equal to the polluters emissions over the course of the year. These permits constitute what 
is akin to a de jure right to pollute.  The idea of allowance permits has often been 
attributed to Dales.  However, Dales focused his research on water rights, whereas two 
years earlier Thomas D. Crocker focused his research on air rights. Thomas D. Crocker,  
The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, THE ECONOMICS OF AIR 
POLLUTION (1966).  Furthermore, W. David Montgomery attempted to provide a deeper 
analysis of the use of allowance markets to deal with pollution problems in his article 
entitled “Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs.” W. David 
Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. OF 
ECON. THEORY 395 (1972). 
 135. Michael A. de Gennaro, Oil Pollution Liability and Control Under International 
Maritime Law: Market Incentives As an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265 (2004).  Similar to the Sulfur Dioxide market, created by Title IV 
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advantage of tradable permits is that the highest value users purchase 
them at a price set by competitive market mechanisms.136        
Unfortunately, however, permits present a number of problems.  
First, liquidity constraints and transaction costs may prevent market 
participants, such as coastal inhabitants, from purchasing these permits 
even though such participants value the permits more.  One option would 
be to have the property rights divided into small enough portions to make 
them affordable to all market participants; however, this division also 
increases transaction costs.  Second, assigning permits to current market 
participants increases barriers for new participants who may be more 
innovative and environmentally friendly.  Third, if the permits are 
assigned to current participants to circumvent the liquidity constraint 
discussed above, then a number of other problems may arise such as the 
holdout problem.  Regardless of whether the permits are assigned to the 
polluters or potential victims, some transaction costs may render the 
market inefficient in spite of its cost savings potential. 
Administratively, tradable permits do not lower costs further than a 
tax would.  The agency in charge still has to identify the culprit of the 
spills, and for spills without a culprit, permits will fail completely.  This 
issue does not exist in other markets, like in the sulfur dioxide market, 
because the sources of pollution do not move and are mandatorily 
monitored.  Permits altogether may not be well adapted to water 
transport, and they may be more successful for oil rigs; nonetheless, the 
same double payment causes problems with both permits and liability.   
Congress ought to strengthen its protection of the environment, but 
water pollution requires a different solution than air pollution.  The next 
section extends further on the current system, and discusses extending 
financial liability. 
IV.  FURTHER CHANGES 
The OPA was reactive legislation.  Hence, more reactions should 
come following the Deepwater Horizon incident.  This Section argues 
that Congress should extend liability to all parties who have the potential 
                                                                                                  
of the Clean Air Act, U.S.C §§ 7651-7651o (1990), he suggests having tradable and 
bankable permits such that the companies who can decrease pollution as cheaply as 
possible will decrease pollution and sell their permits, whereas the companies for whom 
it is expensive to decrease pollution will purchase these permits. 
 136. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has worked on a proposed 
policy entitled Water Quality Trading Policy, 67 FR 34709-01 (2002), and recommended 
such permits because of their cost savings potential. See 
http://www.epa.gov/evaluate/pdf/ wqt.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
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to control the level of care or the level of activity and who benefit from 
the activity.  Finally, since small spills are rarely enforced, the 
punishment should be proportional to the enforcement to reach optimal 
deterrence. 
A.  Lender Liability 
Like in every business, oil transportation involves a large number of 
individuals.137  Since most of these actors benefit from these transactions 
and a few of these actors may encourage cutting corners,  all actors who 
benefit from the transaction should be held liable in an effort to prevent 
environmental disaster. 
The first of such actors are lenders to the oil transport and oil drilling 
companies.  Previous regulations have debated whether to hold lenders 
liable.138  Five reasons support lender liability.  First, lenders can be the 
better cost bearers because they have deeper pockets than borrowers, and 
they can internalize the cost of the whole activity.139  Since borrowers 
must borrow to undertake the risky activity, lenders can foresee that they 
are, or will become, judgment-proof.  Holding lenders liable assures that 
these lenders steer the activity toward a more socially efficient level of 
care, or in the alternative, lend enough to ensure an efficient level of 
care. 
                                            
 137. OECD, supra note 63, at 76, gives a detailed exposition of all the parties who 
stand to lose from an accident. 
 138. CERCLA opened the door to lender liability but later amendments required the 
lender to participate in the management of the operation.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii) 
(2002).  In 1990, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991), the Eleventh Circuit opened the door to a wide range 
of liability when it stated that “a secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, 
without being an operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a 
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation’s treatment of hazardous 
wastes.” Id. at 1557. In the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance 
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-462 (Sept. 30, 1996) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607(n) (2006)), Congress attempted to clarify 
CERCLA’s definition of participating in management and stated that “[p]articipation in 
management . . . does not include merely having the capacity to influence, or the 
underexercised right of control, vessel or facility operators.” 
 139. During a Congressional hearing entitled “Lender Liability Under Superfund 
before the Subcommittee on Transport and Hazardous Materials,” “[r]epresentative Alex 
McMillan of North Carolina suggested a further expansion in the search for ‘deep 
pockets’ to protect the public tax monies already contained in the Superfund.”  See 
Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw.  To Lend or Not to Lend – That Should Not Be 
The Question: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CERCLA,  41 DUKE L.J. 
1211, fn. 53 (1992). 
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Second, lender liability rests on their right to directly control their 
borrowers: their judgment-proof borrowers may be able to afford the 
precautionary care,140 but they do not have enough private incentive to 
exercise the optimal level of care because they externalize the resulting 
harm.  Lenders should be responsible for the consequences of their 
control, or failure to exercise that right, because lenders can correct this 
incentive imbalance.  Lenders may either give enough indirect financial 
incentive or exercise direct monitoring of their borrowers. 
Third, fairness supports lender liability: lenders get the benefit of the 
activity, thus they should bear the costs. The benefits the lenders receive 
are in the form of interest payments or even rent if the lender acts as a 
receiver of a bankrupt borrower; nonetheless, they currently do not bear 
the cost they put on society. 
Fourth, lenders may have superior knowledge about the risk involved 
in a potentially polluting activity because borrowers may be new to the 
business.  Lenders are repeat players who deal with different kinds of 
borrowers.  This asymmetric information makes lenders the superior 
risk-bearer and the better party to decide whether to undertake a given 
activity.141 
Finally, lenders can also spread the risk among their borrowers.  
Since lenders have multiple borrowers, lenders can diversify their risks, 
as long as the borrowers’ pollution risks are uncorrelated.  
In conclusion, lender liability may advance efficiency but these 
arguments have some detractors.142  First, the deep pocket justification 
                                            
 140. “It is now even harder for tanker owners to obtain bank finance for single-hulled 
ships.  Apart from the inherent greater threat of pollution that these vessels pose, much 
single-hulled tonnage now has a very limited prospective trading life on routes to or from 
the USA and Europe.”  OECD, supra note 63, at 69. 
 141. Even if borrowers are the least cost avoidant because they are better able to 
understand precautions, lender liability will encourage knowledgeable lenders to gather 
and disseminate better information about the risks involved. 
 142. See generally Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be?  The Case of 
Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1171 (1995) 
[hereinafter Pitchford 1995]  (Pitchford creates a binary model of accident to explore 
whether imposing lender liability has Pareto-improving qualities.  In his model, the 
lender is vicariously liable for the wrongdoings of its customers.  He does not find that 
holding lenders vicariously liable has welfare improving effects.  He explains that a 
higher than socially efficient level of activity can occur as well as socially inefficient care 
because with full lender liability, lenders charge premiums in the no-accident state of the 
world. These premiums distort incentive, making the no-accident state less attractive 
without affecting the desirability of the accident state.  However, with no-lender liability, 
the decision maker does not invest enough of his capital to take efficient care.  Finally, he 
finds that a “minimum-equity requirement” level of care leads to more efficient levels of 
care.  As will be discussed below, this amounts to borrower selection in the vain of agent 
2013] Limited Solution to a Dangerous Problem 249 
 
does not carry any efficiency weight.  The relationship between a 
borrower and a lender suffers from information asymmetry: the lenders 
may not have all the information they need to determine what kind of 
risk a borrower will take. Nonetheless, lenders can estimate the kind of 
borrower and risk taker they face from the borrower’s financial statement 
and prior history.143   
Second, the lender may not have any clear right to control, or the 
ability to exercise any actual control over the borrowers.144  Therefore, 
                                                                                                  
selection.);  Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, How Liable Should a Lender Be?  
The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment, 91 AM. ECON. 
REV. 724 (2001) (Revisiting Pitchford’s model and modifying the model to make 
damages continuous.  They find that depending on the damage level to the initial 
producer’s wealth, lender liability can be Pareto-improving.); Dieter Balkenborg, How 
Liable Should a Lender Be?  The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental 
Risk: Comment, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 731 (2001) (Revising Pitchford’s model and 
modifying it even further, he makes the level of care a function of the payment the firm 
receives instead of its final wealth.  He turns to the effect of the respective bargaining 
power of the lender and borrower and finds that lenders can exercise leverage on the 
judgment-proof borrower to move toward a more socially optimal outcome.  He affirms 
that making the lender vicariously liable can be welfare-improving in some cases.); 
Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be?  The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms 
and Environmental Risk: Reply 91 AM. ECON. REV. 739 (2001) [hereinafter Pitchford 
2001] (Rohan Pitchford responds that this re-enforces the idea that a “minimum-equity 
requirement” will be Pareto-superior because the lender essentially makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the borrower: the borrower must exercise this minimum level of care or 
the lender does not grant a loan.  If the lender has enough information and good enough 
monitoring, the minimum can be set at the privately efficient level, which coincides with 
the socially efficient level because of full internalization.). 
 143. Pitchford discusses how the lender’s demands will depend upon the borrower’s 
finances because the borrower’s wealth affects the kind of risks that the borrower will 
take.  “ If financiers face some liability, then they may require owners to invest more of 
their wealth in the firm to provide an extra incentive for keeping the accident probability 
low.”  Pitchford 1995, supra note 142,  at 1171.   David Leebron argues that lenders will 
need to know and monitor the wealth of the owners to assess the risk of the credit; 
however, if the lender can form well-founded expectations about their wealth, they will 
still lend without definite information but at a higher rate. David W. Leebron, Limited 
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1565, 1593 n. 91 (1991). 
 144. Lenders may draft loan documents in which they reserve a right of control in 
certain situations like in the case of bankruptcy. Nonetheless, courts distinguish between 
this right of control and actual control because of the potential gap between the two.  The 
Second Circuit found in In re W.T. Grant Company that the common law duty of a lender 
to a borrower or a third party depends upon the exercise of control. In re W.T. Grant 
Company, 699 F.2d 599, 609 (2d Cir. 1983).  Control differs from the prospectus of 
control or even the language in the loan documents. Id.  The language of loan contracts 
restricting the borrower’s activities or requiring the borrower’s actions in case of default 
may help show lender liability; however, this language or the leverage used to obtain this 
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holding the lender liable in this situation amounts to wealth transfer 
without efficiency implications.  However, the lenders can create some 
incentives for borrowers to exercise better care through the lending 
contract.145   
Third, passing on the cost of pollution to all borrowers may price out 
some liquidity-constrained borrowers and thus deprive society of some 
socially efficient activities.  However, the relevant argument explained 
that large oil companies took on more responsibility once Congress 
increased their liability.146  Lenders may follow the same route. 
Fourth, lenders may not be the least cost avoider considering 
borrowers may have a better understanding of their own activity and 
industry. Still, this may not be the case for borrowers in a new industry.  
Furthermore, lenders have financial analysts and the experience that most 
borrowers and industry starters lack.  Finally, spreading the pollution 
cost on all borrowers will increase the cost of borrowing and price out 
some potentially efficient activity. Nonetheless, the socially inefficient 
activities deterred may outweigh the socially efficient activities. 
Congress ought to extend liability to all parties with the capacity to 
control, and all who benefit from the activity.  Although vicarious strict 
lender liability presents some inefficiencies, a negligent lending liability 
rule can address some of these inefficiencies.  A lender should be held 
liable for “negligent lending” which could be defined as lending to risky 
borrowers whose risks the lender knew or should have known.  This 
negligent lending liability mirrors negligent hiring discussed above.  The 
next section turns to other decision makers and expands the argument to 
include criminal liability. 
                                                                                                  
language does not equal control.  Id. at 609-10.  Having the right to control in case of 
default is different from exercising control. 
 145. If the loan contract fully specifies how payments vary with the borrower’s actions 
or if the loan contract allows for restrictions that create credible commitments, then loans 
may be equivalent to a fully capitalized polluter because the lender will minimize 
payment only when the borrower uses the privately and socially optimal level of care and 
the borrower will be able to credibly commit.  However, Pitchford argues that such 
contracts are quite complicated and not the norm.  Pitchford 2001, supra note 142, at 740.  
However, having lender liability may make these efficiency-inducing restrictions more 
common. 
 146. See Brooks, supra note 29, at Table 2.  This table shows that even though 
Congress increased corporate liability exposure with the passage of the OPA in 1990, the 
major oil producing corporations shipped more of their product in-house and hence they 
internalized more of the shipping risks. 
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B.  Shareholder and Employee Liability 
Capacity to control justifies the previous argument supporting lender 
liability.  In agency law, courts can turn to the notion of “actual control” 
to impose vicarious liability; this is referred to as the control test.  
Mendelson offers an alternative test of liability.147  She argues that 
capacity to control is a superior test to actual control for imposing 
vicarious liability.148  Lenders would fall under this category, as would 
shareholders who have the capacity to control the board and managers.  
Whether this rule is efficient and provides good incentive has yet to be 
tested.  However, “[t]here is no reason to suppose that unlimited liability 
would discourage shareholder investment except in firms that, under the 
prevailing norms of tort law, impose net costs on society.”149  Congress 
ought to ensure that all parties that benefit from low care, and with 
capacity to control, are held financially responsible. 
This liability can also be extended to all employees who have a 
capacity to control the care and activity.150  One of the dangers is that 
employees will steer away from risky activity, or in the alternative, 
employees will likely request premiums or indemnification.151  To 
prevent employees from avoiding financial liability, Congress should 
create a non-delegable duty for any action that may harm society beyond 
a certain threshold, or any action that can be avoided with reasonable 
care.152  Furthermore, Congress ought to make this financial liability a 
                                            
 147. Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1278-80 (2002). 
 148. Id. at 1278. 
 149. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1933 (1991). 
 150. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be 
Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1993) (arguing that employees should be held personally liable 
because corporations can only impose minimum sanctions on them.  They advocate for 
different liability standards, with a negligence rule for the employee and strict liability for 
the firm to assure they internalize all the costs of doing business). 
 151. “A combination of doctrine and statute--the almost abstention-like business 
judgment rule and laws permitting exculpation and indemnification of officers and 
directors for failure to exercise due care--has created conditions in which liability for 
breach of the duty of care is practically nonexistent.”  Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and 
Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 648 (2011). 
 152. See, e.g., Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that 
service of a defendant was a non-delegable duty); Hixon v. Sherman-Williams Co., 671 
F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that inherently dangerous activities carry vicarious 
liability). 
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criminal liability or fine, and impose it on employees with capacity to 
control and incentives to exercise low care. 
Criminal liability exists in a number of other contexts for employee 
decisions within a corporate setting.  For instance, the Sherman Act153 
states that employees who “engage in any combination or conspiracy 
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding . . . 
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years.”154  Another 
example of employee decisions leading to incarceration are insider 
trading laws.155   
This begs the question, why does Congress condemn and attempt to 
deter securities fraud and antitrust behavior so heavily?  These 
improprieties are wealth transfers and rent seeking behaviors that 
prosecutors can address through disgorgement and restitution.  The 
environment is not afforded the same level of deterrence, be it prison or 
even treble damages, despite the fact that the effects on the environment 
are irreversible.  Congress may believe corporate employees can always 
avoid securities fraud and antitrust violations but cannot always avoid 
spills.  While some spills are unavoidable, larger incidents such Exxon 
Valdez156 or the BP Deepwater Horizon157 have both involved human 
errors.  Criminal liability must enter the debate of environmental 
protection. 
                                            
 153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004). 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
 155. The insider trading laws themselves do allow for prison time.  For instance, 
amongst others, the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f) (2002) allows for up to twenty 
years imprisonment.  Sarbanes-Oxley, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2009) allows for imprisonment 
up to twenty-five years.  See also  18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2008) (allowing for imprisonment 
up to thirty years for mail fraud); 18 U.S.C § 1343 (2008) (allowing for imprisonment up 
to thirty years for wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1990) (allowing for imprisonment up to 
thirty years for bank fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (allowing for imprisonment up to 
eight years for false statements); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (allowing for imprisonment up 
to five years for perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (allowing for imprisonment up to five 
years for conspiracy). 
 156. “Witnesses testified that before the Valdez left port on the night of the disaster, 
[the captain] downed at least five double vodkas in the waterfront bars of Valdez, an 
intake of about 15 ounces of 80–proof alcohol, enough “that a non-alcoholic would have 
passed out.” Exxon Shipping, supra  note 22 at 477.  The captain of the Valdez still had a 
blood alcohol content of 0.06% 11 hours after the crash, which meant he had a blood 
alcohol content of over 0.2% at the time of the crash. Exxon Shipping, supra note 22, at 
471. 
 157. BOEMRE report, supra note 50, at 191 (“The failure of the rig crew to stop work 
on the Deepwater Horizon after encountering multiple hazards and warnings was a 
contributing cause of the Macondo blowout.”). 
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Finally, Congress has two tools at its disposal when enforcing 
regulations: it can affect the severity of punishment, or it can affect the 
likelihood of enforcement.158  Since the Coast Guard can hardly detect 
small spills, Congress ought to increase the proportionality of the 
punishment: prison deterrence or criminal charges can lead to more 
efficient outcomes.159  In the car context, local governments impose 
criminal liability for a hit and run because of the difficulties associated 
with its enforcement.160  Similarly, if Congress worries about over-
deterrence, it should impose the criminal liability only when the polluter 
does not come forward.  This level of criminal liability will greatly 
further the goals of efficiency. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The OPA has some room for improvement.  First, the single-hull 
regulation poorly targets the problem like most command and control 
regulations.  Second, the Fund, as a stand-alone regulation, can enable 
the Coast Guard to clean up and compensate victims.  This fund-only 
solution has the benefit of avoiding the litigation costs, lengthy delays, 
etc.  However, such a fund needs proper support, and this will be 
achieved through the implementation of a higher tax.  Alternative 
market-based solutions, like permits, are not viable for this kind of 
problem.  Cleanup will always require the existence of the Fund because 
of some of the inherent issues associated with the oil industry, such as 
identifying the origin of small spills. 
Congress may attempt to deal with the double payment issue of 
having a tax on pollution and liability. However, the administrative cost 
may outweigh the benefits.  On top of that, a fund may not work on its 
own because of the moral hazard problem.  Thus, proper deterrence will 
require liability, but Congress should consider some adjustments.  First, 
spills go uncompensated between one quarter and one third of the time.  
Therefore, the liability should be increased as a result of this difference 
                                            
 158. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 1259 (2001). 
 159. Joshua Wright & Douglas Ginsburg, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L 3 (2010) (advocating for imprisonment of employee in cartel cases because 
imposing cost and fines on the corporation does not give them any incentive to not break 
the law because of the agency problem). 
 160. To reach a socially optimal level of care, enforcement and punishment must work 
together.  Because of the lack of monitoring, enforcement may lapse; therefore, this lapse 
makes higher punishment necessary.  Such higher punishment includes but is not limited 
to prison, punitive damages, and fines. 
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between pollution and compensation; Congress should create some 
punitive damage equal to a fourth to a third of the compensatory 
damages.  Congress can also impose financial and criminal liability upon 
employees and managers who attempt to hide spills. 
Some form of corporate liability may also solve some of the current 
loopholes.  Holding the beneficiary of an action liable for his cost leads 
not only to fairness, but also to efficiency.  Therefore, Congress should 
create a new two-part control test for imposing any kind of vicarious, 
corporate, or personal liability.  First, does the entity or person benefit 
from the transaction?  Second, does the entity or person have the 
capacity to exercise control?  If the answer is yes to both questions, the 
oil company should be held financially and potentially criminally liable.  
In the unlikely event of over-deterrence, the employees’ or shareholders’ 
liability may require a third test: does the actor try to conceal its spill? 
While this article has focused primarily on the OPA, some lessons 
are expandable to other environmental regulations.  Congress passed the 
OPA after the Exxon Valdez incident.  It remains to be seen what 
Congress will do after the BP Deepwater Horizon spill.  However, fixing 
some of the issues within the OPA ought to be a starting point. 
